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Revival of Shortwave as a
Military Communication
Channel
Jan Kallberg and Stephen S. Hamilton
United States Military Academy
Abstract—In the last threedecades, the greatpowershavebecome increasinglydependent
onsatellite communication (SATCOM), veryhigh frequency (VHF), andultrahigh frequency
providinghighbandwidth line-of-sight communications.Thesemilitary communication
channels lack resiliencebecauseanelectronicwarfare (EW) campaigncanaffect bothVHF
andSATCOMsimultaneously. The1940spreferredspectrum, high frequency,with its
different propagationpatterns, offersanopportunity formilitarycommunication resiliency in
the21st century. Theconcept of retrogradingcould giveanoperational advantageand
create theability tosustaincommunication inEWsaturatedenvironment.
& DEFENSE FORCES, COAST guard, homeland
security, and emergency management agencies
have, during the last decades, become dependent
and reliant on stable communications providing
ample bandwidth to support operations and
information flowwithin the organization. The cur-
rent deployed tactical and operational communi-
cation networks are highly dependent upon line-
of-sight (LOS) communication utilizing very high
frequency (VHF), ultrahigh frequency (UHF), and
higher frequencies. The information grids are
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tailored by a network of radio, datastream, radio
links, and satellite communication (SATCOM), all
requiring a near to LOS for sufficient propagation,
bandwidth, and transmission quality.
Meanwhile, the efforts to disrupt and degrade
military communications are equally focused on
the VHF/UHF bands that are prevailing for tacti-
cal and operational radio and data traffic. Within
the last decade, especially Russia and China,
have made a dedicated effort to radically
improve their ability in electronic warfare (EW)
and create effects in the electromagnetic spec-
trum (EMS) in the pursuit to deny or degrade tar-
geted communication channels. Parallel with
this development SATCOM communication risks
have increased as several states developed elec-
tromagnetic, kinetic, and cyber ability to disrupt
these communications.
A potential future conflict with a capable
near-peer adversary; Russia or China are notable
in that they have heavily invested in EMS warfare
capacity, and are capable of employing EW
throughout their force structure.1 EW elements
deployed within theaters of operation threaten
to degrade, disrupt, or deny VHF, UHF, and SAT-
COM communication.
In this scenario, high frequency (HF) radio is
a viable backup mode of communication. The
ability retrograde to HF, commonly referred to
as shortwave, creates resilience in an EW-satu-
rated operational environment. The HF networks
provide satisfying bandwidth if the focus is to
transmit operational information, command,
and control.
HISTORICAL PATH
The first globally operating military force, with
a presence on all continents, was the British Army
and the Royal Navy. They were instrumental in
the growth of the British colonial possessions.
Once the British Empire was established, there
was a need to communicate with British colonies
and direct a British military presence. This paved
theway for financing and incentives to rapidly cre-
ate a network of undersea cables that linked the
colonies with Great Britain in the 1850s and
1860s.2 The telegraphy, as a form of domestic
communication, had followed the unprecedented
increase in transportation infrastructure in the
early 1800s. The U.S. railway system in 1830
was 40 miles, and by 1860, 28,920 miles of rail-
road been laid down.3 The telegraph lines fol-
lowed the railroads, and during the American
Civil War, 1861–1865. Both sides used the tele-
graph to instruct and command units during
the engagement.
In comparison to landline, the earlier under-
sea cables struggled with extremely low band-
width down to a word a minute, which increased
over time. The great powers of the time, the
United Kingdom, the United States, France, Rus-
sia, and Germany had in the early 1900s estab-
lished land-based networks of wireless telegraph
stations. At the outbreak of World War One, the
great powers of the day had outfitted their larger
warships with wireless telegraphs using low fre-
quency, also called longwave, and medium fre-
quency, known as medium wave, providing
communication 80–200 km between warships.
Due to the size and electricity consumption of
the early wireless telegraph, the military wire-
less equipment for armies had a limited range,
and the early airborne wireless telegraphs had
ranges that were less than 2 km.
The introduction of shortwave in the 1920s
gave governments, companies, and individuals
the ability to communicate over unprece-
dented distances at a low cost.4 The innovation
of more efficient transmitters also made it pos-
sible to design and produce mobile two-way
radio.4 During World War Two, the Korean
War, and the War in Vietnam, HF was a stan-
dard way of communicating that was gradually
taken over by VHF during the War in Vietnam.
The successful launch of Telstar5 in 1962 and
the evolution of satellite communication during
late 1960 changed the flow of communications.6
In the early 1960s, HF and cable were utilized to
communication to the U.S. or higher com-
mands in theater. Post-Vietnam and the early
1980s, tactical VHF, radio link, and SATCOM
were utilized for communication to higher com-
mands. From the 1980s, this development
towards VHF/UHF LOS communications has
accelerated. Since the early 1990s HF is rarely
utilized by ground forces. Even if HF equipment
is fielded it is seldom used. However, HF con-
tinues to be used for limited tasks within
navies and air forces.
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BANDWIDTH ADDICTION
The vast majority of the world’s modern
armies’ ability to employ HF radio systems has
atrophied significantly since the Cold War as
NATO, and numerous other countries transitioned
to counterinsurgency operations. An era of abun-
dant and close-to-uninterruptedbandwidth is com-
ing to an end as the future threat landscape, and
potential conflicts will likely involve aggressive
EW, counter-SATCOM,7 and anti-satellite meas-
ures.8 Also, satellites can be destroyed by cascad-
ing events due to debris from kinetic anti-satellite
attacks on other spaceborne assets9 or space
debris already existing in orbit.10
After two decades with the uncontested spec-
trum, the U.S. Armed Forces, and a vast majority
of the world’s modern armies, have been used to
having available bandwidth, communications,
and the ability to switch between communication
channels with limited interruption and excellent
quality. The counter insurgency operations have
provided rear operational areas with a stable
energy supply, enabling the ability to set up satel-
lite and radio links, and reliable communication
channels to higher commands, air assets, medical
resources, and the logistics chain.
Any potential near-peer adversaries are fully
aware of our dependence on these communica-
tions channels and how the loss of these chan-
nels would severely impact the modern way of
warfighting. Satellite communications are espe-
cially vulnerable for several reasons. First, the
satellites transmit at lower power levels, making
them easier to jam. Second, weather and space
weather (solar flares) can negatively impact sat-
ellite communications. Third, the compact and
fragile design of the satellite itself makes them
subject to failure due to space debris or poten-
tially an attack from an adversary’s satellite.
Finally, the satellites can be challenging to
upgrade and could, over time, be vulnerable to
cyber attacks.
William J. Lynn, III, the former U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense, stated in the summer of
2011:11 “The willingness of states to interfere with
satellites in orbit has serious implications for our
national security. Space systems enable our mod-
ern way of war. They allow our warfighters to
strike with precision, to navigate with accuracy, to
communicate with certainty, and to see the
battlefield with clarity. Without them, many of our
most important military advantages evaporate.”
Even if the U.S. today is dominant in military
satellite communication, several other countries
are quickly building a spaceborne information
infrastructure, where Russia, China, and India
have taken the lead.
The knowledge that the high-bandwidth,
almost always available, networks will likely be at
least degraded in a future conflict should drive a
cultural shift toward a more frugal usage of com-
munication that reemphasizes the exchange to
what ismission essential.
In the past, the radiotelegraph operators, and
the organizations that utilized the Morse code,
solved the lack of bandwidth by compressingmes-
sages. As an example, “2 GERSUB 10 NM SSW GIB”
transmitted in a fewwords reads two German sub-
marines are sighted ten nautical miles South-
South-West of Gibraltar. During WW I and WW II
trained radiotelegraphists were able to send and
receive information thatmanaged ground, air, and
naval operations over vast spaces. The notion
that current operations needmegabits per second
in available bandwidth is a sign that today’s
armies, coast guard, homeland security, and
emergency management have grown accustomed
to having access to high bandwidth and adjusted
the processes to require these digital streams.
The counterinsurgency battlefield, with bases and
forward operating bases with a full array of infor-
mation systems and communication infrastruc-
ture, close to the area of operation, was able to
deliver high bandwidth close to the actual engage-
ment. The HF networks give a reduced bandwidth
for data transfer, even if it as limited as a 1990s
Hayes 9600 baud dialup modem, but that would
be enough if the exchange is compressed informa-
tion that is mission essential. The Harris PRC-150
HF radio operates at 9600 bits per second using
the STANAG 4539NATO standard protocol.
REEMERGED OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTS
The recent change from a strategic focus on
counterinsurgency to near-peer and peer-conflicts
also extend the areas of operations. The counter-
insurgency operational environment allowed the
establishment of communication hubs in “safe
Resilience and Reliability
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zones” close to the battlefield. Even if these
nations, where counterinsurgency operations
occurred, lacked a national communications infra-
structure, the military communication infrastruc-
ture could be established and sustain the
operation. As General Milley stated,12 “Many of
the conditions we have grown accustomed to
over the past 18 years will not exist in future bat-
tles. Control of the air will be contested; Forward
Operating Bases will not provide a safe haven;
units will be continuously targeted by enemy fires;
and communications and navigation systems will
be intermittent at best.”
Apart from the Syrian civil war and the con-
flict in Eastern Ukraine, the conflicts the last two
decades have had an uncontested spectrum and
access to VHF/UHF with no adversarial EW
assets present. These conditions will likely
change, especially in a peer or near-peer conflict.
The future operations could occur in areas
with limited satellite coverage to enable military
satellite communication over a military space
information grid or leased channels from a com-
mercial operator using mobile satellite services.
In that case, even with no present EW or interfer-
ence, SATCOMcan be unreliable and intermittent.
STATE OF HF (SHORTWAVE)
COMMUNICATIONS
Currently, the competency with HF radio sys-
tems within the U.S. Army is limited; however,
there is a strong case to train and ensure readi-
ness for the utilization of HF communication. Even
in EMS-denied environments, HF radios can pro-
vide stable, beyond-LOS communication permit-
ting the ability to initiate a prompt global strike.
While HF radio equipment is also vulnerable to
electronic attack, it can be difficult to target due
to near vertical incident skywave signal propaga-
tion. This propagation method provides the abil-
ity to reflect signals off the ionosphere in an EMS-
contested environment, establishing communica-
tions beyond the LOS. Due to the signal path, the
ability to target an HF transmitter is much more
complicated than transmissions from VHF and
UHF radios that transmit LOS groundwaves.
One concern is the HF capacity, once seen as
obsolete and replaced by VHF/UHF, has been
removed to free up space and lower weight in sev-
eral fixed-wing, helicopter, and vehicle assets. In
some cases, versions of a particular platform can
differ in the ability to communicate using HF.
Where the older version had the HF capable radios
delivered from the factory in the 1990s; mean-
while, the updated version had HF radios
removed. The removal of HF equipment requires
retrofittingHF ability back into the platform. There
are needs to retrograde by adding, modifying, and
updating the HF capacity in these platforms. Even
if the equipment is fielded to the fighting forma-
tions, the ability across the branches will be frag-
mented and not uniform unless a DOD plan is in
place to ensure their compatibility.
RETROGRADE FOR RESILIENCE
The Russian investment in EW capabilities is
significant, and EW units are organic to any Rus-
sian formation from the brigade combat team
and higher. This can provide a significant strate-
gic advantage in the early stage of a conflict. The
Russian formations can engage cyber and elec-
tromagnetic effects already in the “Initial Period
of War,” within the grey zone before there is an
open conflict.13
The U.S. and allied ground forces can offset ini-
tial strategic inferioritywith airpower, naval power,
and global strike abilities, but this is dependent on
communication channels between ground forces
and joint assets.13 The focus of the adversary’s EW
is to deny U.S. communications. One alternative is
to retrograde and utilize HF communications,
which was the communication channel of World
War II and the Korean War. HF radio waves propa-
gate by bouncing off the ionosphere allowing for
beyond the LOS communications. Due to the sky-
wave propagation pattern, it is more difficult for
the enemy to perform spectrum denial. Modern HF
equipment is approximately the same in weight
and size compared to VHF equipment and does not
hinder usage by dismounted troops.14
Even in EMS-denied environments, HF radios
can provide stable, beyond-LOS communication
permitting the ability to initiate a prompt global
strike. While HF (high frequency) radio equipment
is also vulnerable to electronic attack, it can be dif-
ficult to target due to near vertical incident sky-
wave signal propagation. This propagation
method provides the ability to reflect signals off
the ionosphere in an EMS-contested environment,
establishing communications beyond the LOS
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within a regional area. Due to the signal path, the
ability to target an HF transmitter is more compli-
cated than transmissions fromVHF andUHF radios
that transmit LOS groundwaves. Also, modern dig-
ital transmissionmodes allow for communications
to occur at low power levels making it more diffi-
cult for the adversary to detect these signals.
Alarmingly, as hostile near-peer adversaries
reemerge, it is necessary to re-establish HF alter-
natives should very-HF, UHF, or SATCOM come
under attack and no longer remain viable options
for battlefield communications. HF communica-
tion has its inherent weaknesses and challenges.
Common challenges are antenna size and configu-
ration and propagation changes throughout the
day and night due to changes in the ionosphere.
Still, it does not remove the fact that it can provide
communications beyond the LOS,which can serve
as an alternative in critical junctures. By stepping
back and being able to retrograde to HF as a resil-
iency measure, the U.S. is increasing communica-
tion redundancy. This also adds an asymmetric
advantage when the adversary has to divert EW
assets with a different set of requirements to
address the HF ability.
HF radio signals propagate by bouncing off
the ionosphere and require more resources to
disrupt and degrade. The HF propagation pat-
terns would send signals to broader areas, which
allows for the adversary to hear the signal and
direct countermeasures. Still, it also will enable
parts of the propagation to pass through enough
to get communication established even in a high
saturated EW environment. HF jamming equip-
ment requires more energy and has a significant
signature, which enables U.S. and NATO neutral-
izing attacks with stand-off weaponry and anti-
radiation missiles to be successful. The Russian
Armed Forces utilize HF communications as
well, and a broad and unrestricted HF jamming
can degrade and disrupt their own communica-
tions. There is also a possibility that the HF
transmission propagates in a way it cannot be
heard by the adversary providing undisrupted
communication when utilizing low probability of
intercept and low probability of detection tech-
niques. On the other hand, LOS communications
have a more narrow propagation channel, which
allows the EW attacker higher certainty that
communications are denied or degraded.
There is limited competency with HF radio sys-
tems within all the branches; however, there is a
strong case to train and ensure readiness for the
utilization of HF communication. Even in EMS
denied environments, HF radios can provide sta-
ble, beyond-LOS communication permitting the
ability to initiate a prompt global strike. While HF
radio equipment is also vulnerable to electronic
attack, it can be difficult to target when configured
to use near vertical incident skywave signal propa-
gation. This high-angle take-off propagation
method provides the ability to refract signals off
the ionosphere in an EMS-contested environment,
establishing communications beyond the LOS out
to 400 miles. Due to the high-angle signal path, the
ability to direction find and target an HF transmit-
ter is more complicated than transmissions from
VHF and UHF radios that transmit LOS ground
waves. Also, Russian listening posts located out-
side of the 400-mile radius cannot intercept the
communications. The recent digitalmodes utilizing
3GAutomatic Link Establishment (ALE) technology
allows for digital communication at lower power
levels than what was previously required for voice.
In addition, this mode simplifies operation by auto-
matically selecting the optimal frequency for com-
munication to other HF nodes in the network. This
technology allows for tac chat messaging along
with digital voice within a 3G ALE network. Using
lower power is a crucial advantage when trying to
prevent direction finding, and adding encryption to
the digital signal helps prevent signal interception.
The HF spectrum offers low-cost opportuni-
ties to increase unit survivability and increase
battlefield effectiveness by achieving a stealthier
communication channel that potential adversar-
ies will have difficulties to find the source of the
transmission. HF should be included in any uni-
t’s communication PACE (Primary Alternate Con-
tingency Emergency) plan as the emergency
method at a minimum. The expense to attain an
improved HF-readiness level is low compared to
other defense initiatives, yet with a high return
on investment. In the U.S., the equipment (Harris
AN/PRC-150) has already been fielded to maneu-
ver units, and foreign forces have similar equip-
ment already purchased, which enables these
forces to be retrograde to generate resiliency.
After almost three decades of limited interest
in ground forces’ HF communications, there are
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knowledge gaps to fill to ensure the optimal tech-
niques, tactics, and procedures. Science and tech-
nology have during these decades advanced,
therefore there multiple opportunities to cost-
effectively enhance and improve the HF communi-
cation ability, especially pushing targeting data
through HF communications. The revival of HF
communications as a resilience measure will pos-
ture the Joint Force, and its branches, in a state of
higher readiness for future conflicts.
CONCLUSION
In the last three decades, the great powers
have become increasingly dependent on satellite
communication (SATCOM),15 VHF, and UHF, pro-
viding high bandwidth LOS communications.
Thesemilitary communication channels lack resil-
ience because an EW campaign can affect both
VHF and SATCOM simultaneously. The 1940s pre-
ferred spectrum, HF, with its different propagation
pattern, offers an opportunity formilitary commu-
nication resiliency in the 21st century.
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